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The formation of a multidisciplinary practice, or MDP, is a
phenomenon that has arrived with great suddenness. At a re-
cent program on the subject, fewer than 10% of the attorneys in
attendance had heard of MDPs more than a year ago.' The po-
sition to be taken by the organized bar towards MDPs is one of
the most important issues facing the legal profession in the
United States and throughout the world. Whatever position
the bar takes on MDPs, it will have an impact on the practice of
law for many years to come. It is sure to influence not only how
we practice law, but also how we define ourselves as lawyers
and how the public perceives us.
This is an issue whose effect is not limited to only one seg-
ment of the bar. It is not a large firm issue or a small firm is-
sue or a specialty issue. The decision to prohibit or regulate
MDPs will affect virtually all practicing lawyers, no matter
what their practice situation. In addition, the resolution of the
MDP issue involves many of the fundamental core values of the
legal profession that are not re-examined on a regular basis.
I. INTRODUCTION TO MDPS
Perhaps the best place to begin is to identify what are
MDPs. In its simplest form, an MDP is a lawyer or lawyers
having nonlawyer partners in a firm or other professional en-
tity that provides legal and nonlegal services. The firm may be
controlled by lawyers or nonlawyers. Furthermore, an MDP
t Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer, American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA). I wish to thank Macarena Tamayo Calabrese for her out-
standing assistance in the preparation of this Article. The Article is an adap-
tation of an address by the author at the University of Minnesota Law School
Homecoming CLE Seminar, October 30, 1999. The views expressed in this Ar-
ticle are those of the author and do not express ABA policy unless so indicated.
1. Informal poll of attorneys in attendance at the University of Minne-




involves lawyers sharing their legal fees with nonlawyers.
Permitting either scenario is at the root of the clash between
opponents and proponents of MDPs. To permit such fee shar-
ing would go against the long adhered-to ethical rules for law-
yers. The varying versions of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct that have been adopted in every state now prohibit
lawyers from practicing in a firm with nonlawyers who have an
ownership interest in the firm, and they prohibit lawyers from
sharing legal fees with nonlawyers. 2 There is an exception to
that blanket prohibition in the District of Columbia, which is
examined later.3
For some, the creation of MDPs represents an overt at-
tempt by other professionals to expand their business services
into the delivery of legal services. The most prominent of these
other professional groups are accounting firms-specifically the
Big Five accounting firms that already employ thousands of
lawyers in the United States and worldwide.4 It should be
stressed, however, that the issue is much broader than simply
accounting firms practicing law. Opponents of MDPs are con-
cerned that if this development is permitted, we could soon
have title companies openly practicing real estate law, banks
practicing estate planning and probate law, and even large de-
partment stores having a legal department where legal services
could be purchased.
Proponents of multidisciplinary firms argue that we need
to approach client needs in a packaged manner, because clients
are seeking this kind of advice.5 They are accustomed to re-
ceiving comprehensive, multi-professional advice on a variety of
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a) & (d)(1)
(1983).
3. See D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1991). See infra
text accompanying notes 42-45.
4. The "Big Five" are: Arthur Andersen LLP, Deloitte & Touche, LLP,
Ernst & Young LLP, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and KPMG Peat Marwick
LLP. In 1997, the Wall Street Journal reported that: "Ernst & Young... has
800 tax attorneys on its U.S. staff, double the 400 it had several years ago.
Price Waterhouse has around 500 tax lawyers in the U.S. up from 250 three
years ago. Arthur Anderson has 1,000 tax attorneys, 20% more than it had in
1994." Elizabeth MacDonald, Accounting Firms Hire Lawyers and Other At-
torneys Cry Foul, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1997, at B8. These numbers have only
increased over the last three years, especially with the merger of Price Water-
house and Coopers Lybrand.
5. See Hearing Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Nov. 13, 1998) (written remarks of Steven Alan Bennett, former General




subjects in other areas. And, say the proponents, this is what
clients will increasingly expect in the area of legal services.
Proponents warn that if American lawyers are not able to pro-
vide this kind of multi-professional advice, the clients simply
will obtain it in other ways. 6 The effect, argue proponents,
would be to leave the bar increasingly marginalized and not
playing the central and proper role in the provision of legal
services.
In short, proponents see the push for MDPs as having
gained sufficient momentum that it no longer can be blunted or
stopped. Rather, they seek to harmonize the legal practice into
the new economic reality while preserving the level of profes-
sionalism the public has come to expect in lawyers. Indeed, the
phenomenon is occurring worldwide, and is more advanced in
many other countries than the United States, where, as stated
previously, it is not permitted under the current rules of lawyer
conduct although anecdotal evidence suggests it is occurring
nonetheless. The proponents say MDPs are necessitated by
rapid technological advances, the globalization of capital and
financial markets, and greater regulation of commercial activ-
ity in this country and throughout the world. Because all of
these challenges are multidisciplinary-involving economic is-
sues, financial issues, technology issues, and legal issues-the
advice a client needs must draw upon the talented resources of
all of these professions in order to be effective.7
Proponents say that large corporations expect multidisci-
plinary advice and, in fact, are demanding it right now.8 In ad-
dition, we are told that new generations of Americans also want
this type of advice.9 Baby boomers are used to getting compre-
hensive, multidisciplinary information in the services that they
purchase. Bundled services are what young generations of
Americans are expecting. And, therefore, the legal profession
must respond to this expectation. Proponents have used the
6. See id.
7. See Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Mar. 11, 1999) (written remarks of Irwin L. Treiger and William J. Lipton,
Co-chairs, National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants),
available at <http-//www.abanet.orgcpr/treigerl.html>.
8. See ABA COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN
BAR Ass'N, UPDATED BACKGROUND AND INFORMATIONAL REPORT AND
REQUEST FOR COIENTS (1999), available at <http://www.abanet.orgJcpr/
febmdp.html> [hereinafter UPDATE]; Long Arm of the Law: The Big Five May
Be Right that Clients Want Them to Move into Legal Services, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 9, 1999, at 29.
9. See UPDATE, supra note 8.
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phrase "one-stop shopping" to describe MDPs,' 0 referring to the
fact than an MDP is one place to go to get a variety of profes-
sional opinions that bear upon a problem a client might have.
The proponents of multidisciplinary firms say that the re-
strictions on them in our rules of professional conduct are relics
of the early twentieth century, when the economic circum-
stances were very different, and accordingly, legal problems
were very different than now. The proponents assert that those
restrictions are no longer appropriate in the present economic
circumstances. I
Opponents, on the other hand, see the advance of MDPs as
not only an incursion into the legal client base and a threat to
their economic foundation, but as inevitably causing erosion of
the quality of professionalism long required and honored in the
legal profession. The opponents of multidisciplinary firms are
concerned with the ramifications of such an expansion and view
it as an encroachment by the Big Five accounting firms into the
practice of law. In their view, the audit function of accounting
firms has become more mature, limiting growth in that area,
and so the accounting firms began to move into an array of con-
sulting services. 12 In many of the Big Five accounting firms,
the consulting side is as large or larger than the auditing side
of the firm already. 13 As that consulting business began to de-
velop, it was a natural extension to include consulting involving
legal services. Therefore, in the view of the opponents, MDPs
represent an attempt by the accounting profession to engage in
the practice of law.
Opponents argue that the core values of the legal profes-
sion are under attack by the MDP phenomenon. Principally,
among these core values is an attorney's primary duty of loy-
alty to a client.14 In the view of the opponents, that duty of loy-
alty cannot be discharged adequately if an attorney is an em-
ployee of a firm controlled by nonlawyers and that firm is not
required to abide by the same rules regarding conflict of inter-
est as the legal profession.' 5
10. E.g., Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Feb. 4, 1999) (written remarks of Stefan F. Tucker, Chair, Section of Taxation
Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice), available at
<http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/tuckerl.html>.
11. See, e.g., id.
12. See John Gib6aut, Squeeze Play, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 43-44.
13. See id.
14. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. 1 (1983).
15. See Gib~aut, supra note 12, at 47.
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Also involved is the issue of confidentiality of client com-
munications. 16 Opponents argue that there is no comparable
duty of confidentiality in other professions. An MDP including
lawyers and nonlawyers would, therefore, in their view, break-
down the relationship of trust that must exist between lawyers
and clients. 17
From the opponents' point of view, this is a critical prob-
lem. When the general public thinks of accounting, it primarily
focuses on the auditing function. In that regard, the public has
come to realize that the auditor is under a duty to disclose
problems and discrepancies discovered in the audit with no
duty of confidentiality to the client. Lawyers, on the other
hand, are perceived by the public as being the client's specific
advocate, such that the lawyer is under a duty not to disclose
problems or matters harmful to the client. Consequently, op-
ponents argue the merging of accounting and legal profession
in a multidisciplinary practice cannot help but raise the ques-
tion in the mind of the general public as to how one part of a
firm must disclose while another part of the firm may not dis-
close. The result, opponents claim will be a severe loss of confi-
dence in the legal profession and the creation of confusion
about the roles of professionals handling their cases.
As a corollary, opponents fear that MDPs would destroy
the professional independence of attorneys, the responsibility to
make decisions in the best interest of the client, unconstrained
by any other interest.1 8 Indeed, they say, since the independ-
ence of the attorney is essential to free and independent democ-
racies, MDPs represent a threat to our democratic society. 19
Opponents note that the legal profession has well-
developed conflict of interest rules that prevent an attorney
from representing a client if any other interest would conflict.20
Conflict of interest rules are not as stringent in other profes-
sions, particularly in the accounting profession, where ac-
16. See Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Nov. 13, 1998) (written remarks of Linda Galler, Hofstra University) avail-
able at <http'//www.abanet.orglcpr/galler.html> [hereinafter Galler].
17. See Address by Gary T. Johnson to the ABA General Practice, Solo
and Small Firm Section, Cleveland, Ohio (Oct. 8, 1999).
18. See id.
19. Cf. Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Feb. 4, 1999) (written remarks of Lawrence J. Fox, Drinker Biddle & Reath
LLP) available at <http://www.abanet.orglcpr/foxl.html>.




counting firms may represent clients that have conflicts be-
tween them.21 And, opponents fear, MDPs would violate rules
against unauthorized practice of law by permitting nonlawyers,
untrained in legal subjects, to provide legal advice. 22
II. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW AND MDPS
Adding to the complexity of the issue is the emergence in
recent years of firms that are already engaged in what might be
considered the practice of law. Firms currently exist that spe-
cialize in mergers and acquisitions, advising corporations on a
variety of issues including legal issues, in a merger and acqui-
sition context. These firms include investment bankers,
economists, and lawyers. In addition, financial planners, who
may not be lawyers, give advice, on the application of tax laws
to their clients. Human resource companies give advice to their
clients about employment practices and the firing of employees.
Litigation support firms include technology experts to advise
law firms how to manage litigation more effectively by using
new technologies.23
Many of these firms already providing services that might
be considered the practice of law have associations with large
accounting firms and benefit from cross-selling. If a firm rep-
resents a client in one area, it can encourage that client to use
other services, such as their human resources department or
their litigation support department.
It should also be noted that the accounting profession al-
ready provides legal services in connection with providing tax
advice to clients. Federal regulations, which preempt the state
unauthorized practice of law statutes, permit accountants to
provide tax advice.24 In recent years, accounting firms have
expanded that authority. Currently, accounting firms repre-
21. See Galler, supra note 16.
22. See COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, REPORTER'S NOTES (1999), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/
mdpappendixc.html>.
23. See Lowell J. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next
Step, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1359, 1372 (2000).
24. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963); COMMISSION ON
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, BACKGROUND PAPER ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PRACTICE: ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS (1999), available at <http'//www.
abanet.org/cpr.multicomreprot0ll9.html> [hereinafter BACKGROUND PAPER];
Mark H. Ely, Multidisciplinary Partnerships: Accounting Firms and the Prac-




sent clients in the federal district court, the federal claims court
and in other areas that might traditionally be considered to be
central to the practice of law.25 In 1998, the accounting profes-
sion successfully lobbied Congress to enact a privilege, similar
to the attorney-client privilege, for accountants giving tax ad-
vice to clients.26 Now, in competing for tax business, account-
ants can offer clients a similar confidentiality privilege to that
offered by attorneys.
Some have argued that the best way to deal with the MDP
phenomenon is to more strictly enforce the unauthorized prac-
tice of law statutes. It should be observed that there have been
few prosecutions of Big Five accounting firms or other consult-
ing firms for the unauthorized practice of law. In one of the
rare investigations of a Big Five accounting firm in recent
years, the unauthorized practice of law committee in Texas re-
cently concluded that it would not file a complaint against Ar-
thur Andersen after an expensive eleven-month investigation. 27
In 1999, the State of Virginia reached the same conclusion with
respect to compliance law services offered by a professional
services firm.28
The issue is far from over, however, accounting firms such
as Ernst & Young continue to push the limit on what is accept-
able under the current rules. The most recent example is the
creation of the law firm McKee Nelson Ernst & Young in
Washington, D.C.29 The law firm not only bears the name of
one of the Big Five accounting firms, but more importantly, it is
financed by one of the Big Five.30 This gives rise to the ques-
tion of whether this loan constitutes a financial interest or
ownership in the firm, and, if so, does it constitute the unau-
thorized practice of law? In addition, the law firm will be
physically located in a space adjacent to the accounting firm's
25. See BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 24.
26. Section 3411 of Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998 added § 7525 to the IRS Code. See BACKGROUND PAPER, supra
note 24 (citing ALI-ABA, The New Tax Practitioner-Client Privilege the Pro-
tects Tax Advice from Disclosure: What CPAs, Enrolled Agents, Enrolled Actu-
aries, and Clients Need to Know (1998)).
27. See UPDATE, supra note 8; Arthur S. Hayes, Accountants v. Lawyers:
Bean Counters Win, NAVL L.J., Aug. 10, 1998, at A4; Tom Herman, A Special
Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Law Developments, WALL ST.
J., July 29, 1998, at Al.
28. See UPDATE, supra note 8.
29. See Mark Hansen, All Aboard for MDP Train, But Accounting Giant's




D.C. office.31 According to William Lipton, vice chair of Ernst &
Young's tax services, the alliance gives his firm a virtual MDP
and "will serve as model for the future, when the barriers [to
multidisciplinary practice] do come down."32 It is apparent
both firms are testing the waters to see how far they can push
the regulations.
The fact is that, notwithstanding prohibitions by the ethics
rules, consulting firms are employing more and more lawyers to
provide law-related advice as part of their multidisciplinary
service to their clients-thus, blurring even further the lines
between consulting and legal services, which has made it more
difficult to prosecute these firms for the unauthorized practice
of law.
III. INTERNATIONAL MDPS
As noted earlier, the MDP phenomenon is more advanced
in some other countries than in the United States. In part this
is because the ethics rules in other countries are different than
the rules in this country. There are also differences in the his-
torical development of the legal profession in other countries.
England, for example, is thought to be very much like the
United States because both have a common law tradition. In
fact the practice of law in England is divided between barris-
ters, who are authorized to represent clients in court, and so-
licitors, who handle other legal transactions. In recent years,
solicitors are also authorized to appear in court in many situa-
tions. England does not have rules that define the practice of
law and prevent nonlawyers from engaging in it. The English
statutes relating to the authority of solicitors define the specific
tasks they are authorized to do, such as write a deed or will,
but the provision is not so broad as to give solicitors exclusive
authority to provide legal advice to clients.33 One of the rea-
sons American law firms have been able to establish offices in
London and the rest of the United Kingdom in such large num-
bers is because there are no laws prohibiting American lawyers
from offering legal advice. The only rules that constrain these
developments are those of full disclosure to clients and the re-
31. See id.
32. Id. (alterations in original).
33. See Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Nov. 12, 1998) (written remarks of Alison Crawley, The Law Society of Eng-
land and Wales), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/crawley.html>.
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quirement that a person offering legal advice cannot misrepre-
sent their qualifications. 34
The practice of law rules in civil law countries are also very
different from those in the United States. It is common for
some activities that are part of or similar to the practice of law
to be done by professionals other than lawyers in civil law
countries. France, for example, has the profession of the no-
taire, who need not be a lawyer even though the notaire does
many of the things that a lawyer typically does in the United
States. 35 In addition, the largest firm offering legal services in
France currently is one of the Big Five accounting firms.3 6
IV. CURRENT PROHIBITION OF MDPS
The primary ethical rule currently applicable to multidis-
ciplinary practices is Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.3 7 The Model Rules, promulgated by the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA), have been adopted in some form in
every American jurisdiction. Rule 5.4(a) provides that a lawyer
or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, subject
to some exceptions that are not relevant to this discussion.38
This is a clear prohibition on MDPs sharing legal fees. Rule
5.4(b) provides that a lawyer shall not form a partnership with
a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of
the practice of law.39 This is also a clear prohibition of MDP.
Finally, Rule 5.4(d) provides that a lawyer shall not practice
with or in the form of a professional corporation or association
authorized to practice law if a nonlawyer has any interest
therein, is a corporate director or officer, or has the right to di-
rect or control the professional judgment of the lawyer.40 Con-
sequently, Rule 5.4(d) also prohibits an MDP arrangement. All
of these sections of Rule 5.4 would have to be modified if IVDPs
were to be permitted in some form.
34. See BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 24.
35. See id.; see also Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice (Feb. 6, 1999) (testimony of Gerad Mazet, President of the Interna-
tional Commission of the French National Bar Council), available at
<http//www.abanet.org/cpr/mazet.html>.
36. The biggest "law firm" in France is FIDAL, which is part of KPMG.
See UK and US Firms Among Top Fee Earners in Paris, LAWYER, Oct. 11,
1999, at 3.
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1983).
38. See id. Rule 5.4(a).
39. See id. Rule 5.4(b).
40. See id. Rule 5.4(d).
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Note that nothing in Rule 5.4 or in any of the other rules of
professional conduct prohibit a lawyer from working with pro-
fessionals trained in another discipline, if that cooperation is
needed in the representation of a client. A lawyer may employ
a professional from another discipline on the staff of a law firm.
A lawyer may retain a professional from another discipline,
with the client's consent, in connection with the representation
of a client. And a lawyer may work with a professional from
another discipline if that professional is employed by the client
in connection with the matter. Furthermore, a lawyer may own
a company employing professionals offering other products cre-
ated by the nonlawyers.41 That also does not violate the rules.
What is prohibited is a multidisciplinary practice-an in-
tegrated practice in which a lawyer practices law, with a part-
ner who is not a lawyer, or shares fees with a nonlawyer.
Those are the critical facts prohibited by Rule 5.4.
The District of Columbia has a slightly different Rule 5.4.
In the 1980s, there was a major revision of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct after an ABA report prepared by a Com-
mission chaired by Robert Kutak.42 The Kutak Commission
recommended some liberalization in this area, and the only ju-
risdiction to adopt this recommendation was the District of
Columbia. In the District of Columbia, Rule 5.4, as adopted,
permits a lawyer to enter into a partnership and share fees
with a nonlawyer if the partnership only provides legal services
to a client.43 If the partnership provides any services other
than legal services, then the partnership is not permitted.
The District of Columbia rule permits a law firm to admit
an accountant as a partner to assist the firm in their tax prac-
tice, or an economist partner to assist it in its antitrust prac-
tice. It permits a family law firm to admit a psychologist or
psychiatrist as a partner to assist the firm in its family law
practice. And it permits a law firm doing government lobbying
to admit a lobbyist as a partner, even though that lobbyist is
not a lawyer. The D.C. rule, however, requires that the only
services provided by the firm be the practice of law. If it pro-
duces any other product or engages in any other services, the
41. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.7 (1994).
42. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROF'L STANDARDS, AMERICAN
BAR Ass'N, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 175-78 (1981).
43. See D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1990).
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multidisciplinary partnership would not be permitted in the
District of Columbia.
It is interesting to note that the District of Columbia ex-
ception has not resulted in many law firms having partners
who are not lawyers. In testimony before the ABA Commission
on MDPs, the ethics counsel to the District of Columbia Bar of-
fered the opinion that there were two factors responsible for
this lack of law firm interest.44 First, is the requirement that
the only purpose of the firm be the practice of law. This would
prevents the nonlawyer professional from providing services
that are not in support of legal services. Second, an ABA opin-
ion issued in the early 1990s provided that a D.C. law firm
having offices in another jurisdiction could not have nonlawyer
partners.45 Since a large number of D.C. law firms have offices
elsewhere, that opinion precludes many of the larger firms from
having such an arrangement. It should be noted, however, that
the D.C. rule would not permit most MDPs, because MDPs in-
volve a sharing of fees and partnership for a range of services
and not just the provision of legal services.
IV. COMMISSION REPORT ON MDPS
This brings us to the developments of the past two years.
In August 1998, then president of the ABA, Philip S. Anderson,
appointed a twelve-person Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice to examine the MDP phenomenon. The Commission is
composed of a cross-section of our profession, and it includes
lawyers in varying settings of private practice, law professors,
and judges. Chairing the Commission is Sherwin Simmons, a
lawyer practicing with Steel, Hector, & Davis in Miami, Flor-
ida.4 6 When the Commission was appointed, the views of the
Commission members on MDPs were not known, so that the
Commission was not appointed with an expectation that it
would reach any predictable outcome. It included prominent
and distinguished lawyers, judges and professors, many active
in the ethics area, to represent a variety of backgrounds in
helping to determine what the profession should do.47
44. See Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Nov. 12, 1998) (testimony of Susan Gilbert, Ethics Counsel for the District of
Columbia Bar), available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/gilbertl198.html>.
45. See id.
46. See BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 24.
47. Members of the Commission are Carl Bradford, a state court judge in
Portland, Maine; Paul Friedman, a U.S. District Court judge in Washington,
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The Commission held a number of hearings around the
country, and it soon became apparent that the bars of other
countries were closely watching what was occurring in the
United States. At some of the hearings, bar presidents and ex-
ecutive directors from other countries flew in to testify or ob-
serve.48 I have been told by more than one foreign bar leader
that what happens in the United States is going to determine
the practice of law worldwide. Therefore, this is not just an
American issue-how the legal profession in the United States
decides to proceed will impact the rest of the world as well.
The Commission announced early in its activities that it
had a number of questions. First, how would clients be harmed
or benefited by amending the Model Rules to permit lawyers to
enter into MDPs? Second, how would the lawyers' independent
professional judgment be impaired by allowing these arrange-
ments? Third, how different are the standards that govern the
conduct of accountants and accounting firms? Fourth, if the
Model Rules were amended to permit MDPs, what changes
D.C.; Phoebe Haddon, a law professor at Temple Law School; Geoffrey Hazard,
a law professor at Pennsylvania Law School and former Executive Director of
the American Law Institute; Roberta Katz, CEO of the Technology Network;
Caroline Lamm, a lawyer with White & Case in Washington, D.C.; Robert
Mundheim, former Dean of the Pennsylvania Law School and a lawyer at
Sherman & Sterling; Steven Nelson, a lawyer with the Minnesota law firm of
Dorsey & Whitney; Burnele Powell, Dean of the University of Missouri-Kansas
City Law School; Michael Traynor, a lawyer with Cooley Godward in San
Francisco; Herbert Wander, a lawyer with Katten Muchen & Zavis in Chicago;
and two ABA Board of Governors Liaisons: Joanne Garvey, a lawyer with
Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe in San Francisco; and Seth Rosner, of
counsel to Jacobs, Persinger & Parker in New York. See id.
48. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice (Nov. 12, 1998) (testimony of Michel Gout, President, Council of the Bars
and Law Societies of the European Union), available at <http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/gout1l98.html>; id. (Nov. 12, 1998) (testimony of Alison
Crawley, Head of Professional Ethics of the Law Society of England and
Wales), available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/crawleyll98.html>; id. (Nov.
13, 1998) (testimony of Andrew Scott, President, Law Institute of Victoria in
Melbourne, Australia), available at <http'/www.abanet.org/cpr/scottll98.
html>; id. (Feb. 4, 1999) (testimony of Hans-Jurgen Hellwig, Vice-President,
Deutscher Anvalterein), available at <http'J/www.abanet.org/cpr/hellwig.
html>; id. (Feb. 6, 1999) (testimony of Gerard Mazet, President, International
Commission of the French National Bar Council), available at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mazet.html>; id. (Aug. 8, 1999) (testimony of John
Craig, President-Elect, Inter-Pacific Bar Association), available at
<http'/www.abanet.org/cpr/craig.html>; id. (Aug. 8, 1999) (testimony of Elisa-
beth Fura-Sandstrom, President, Swedish Bar Association), available at
<http'/www.abanet.org/cpr/sandstrom.html>; id. (Aug. 8, 1999) (testimony of




should be made in the rules to preserve client confidentiality
and avoid conflict of interest?49
After several hearings and meetings, the Commission is-
sued its Report in July 1999.50 Nearly all observers were sur-
prised that the Commission came out with a unanimous report.
The recommendation of the Commission was that MDPs be
permitted, subject to certain restrictions.5' The Commission
concluded that this is a phenomenon that is already occurring,
and the most beneficial approach would be to regulate it and
not attempt to prohibit it. 52 The Commission determined that
it would be possible to satisfy the interests of clients and law-
yers by authorizing the option of a multidisciplinary firm with-
out compromising the core values of the legal profession essen-
tial for protecting clients.5 3
In its Recommendation, the Commission recognized the
importance of the core values of the legal profession. Its first
recommendation was that the legal profession should adopt and
maintain rules of professional conduct to protect its core values:
independence of professional judgement, protection of confiden-
tial client information, and loyalty to clients through avoidance
of conflicts of interest.54 Nevertheless, the Commission con-
cluded that it should not permit existing rules to unnecessarily
inhibit the development of new structures for more effective
delivery of legal services and better public access to the legal
system.55 The Commission's second recommendation was that
a lawyer should be permitted to share legal fees with a nonlaw-
yer, subject to certain safeguards that protect the core values of
the profession.5 6
The key recommendation was the third, that a lawyer be
permitted to deliver legal services through a multidisciplinary
practice, defined as a partnership, professional corporation or
49. See BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 24.
50. See COMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR





54. See COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR




56. See id. Recommendation 2.
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other association or entity that includes lawyers and nonlaw-
yers and has, as one but not all of its purposes, the delivery of
legal services to a client other than the MDP itself.57 An MDP
was defined so as to include an arrangement by which a law
firm joins with one or more other professional firms to provide
services, including legal services, and there is a direct or indi-
rect sharing of profits as a result of the arrangement.58
The Report accompanying the Commission's recommenda-
tions noted that as far as professional independence and judg-
ment of lawyers is concerned, there are many current settings
in which lawyers already work for nonlawyer employers. 59
That includes legal departments of government offices and of
union sponsored prepaid legal services programs.60 In those
situations, the Commission noted, the independence of the law-
yer has been maintained.61
The Commission did recommend changes to the Model
Rules to require that an MDP, if permitted, must agree to the
independence of the lawyers in the firm so that a lawyer could
not raise a defense to a ethics charge by replying, "I was only
doing what my employer told me to do."62 An MDP's chief offi-
cer must agree not to interfere with the independent judgment
of the lawyers in the firm, and to establish and maintain proce-
dures to assure that independence.6 3 The MDP would be re-
quired to segregate the client funds, as is now the case with re-
spect to law firms.64 The lawyers in the MDP would be
required to abide by all the professional responsibility require-
ments for lawyers. 65 And the nonlawyers must respect the role
and responsibility of the lawyers.66
With respect to confidentiality, the Commission recognized
the problem of different professional rules, and concluded it
should be dealt with as a matter of disclosure. 67 For example, if
57. See id. Recommendation 3.
58. See id.
59. See REPORT, supra note 50.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, APPENDIX A (1999), available at <http:www.abanet.org/
cpr/mdpappendixa.html> (proposed Rule 5.1).
63. See RECOMMENDATION, supra note 54, Recommendation 14.
64. See id. Recommendation 14(C).
65. See id. Recommendation 14(D).
66. See id. Recommendation 14(E).
67. See id. Recommendation 9.
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a lawyer receives information from a client, the lawyer is duty
bound not to disclose that information without the client's per-
mission. On the other hand, if a mental health professional
learns from a client of the abuse of children, that professional
has an obligation to disclose this information to government
authorities. The Commission stated that these differences need
to be made clear to clients, so that they will know which profes-
sional rules will apply depending upon whom they talk to.68
The clients must be told who are the lawyers and that commu-
nications to them will be held in confidence. The nonlawyers
should be clearly identified to clients so that they will know if
there is no privilege protecting confidential communications to
them.
With respect to conflict of interest, the Commission rec-
ommended that a multidisciplinary firm should be governed by
the same rules of professional conduct as a law firm.6 9 Applica-
tion of this recommendation would effectively prevent major
accounting firms from operating in the form of an MDP because
the Big Five accounting firms would have difficulty complying
with the conflict of interest rules applicable to law firms. In-
deed, the American Institute of Public Accountants has made a
statement about the Commission's Report, indicating that they
do not find it very helpful in dealing with the situation.70
The Report of the Commission was issued just before the
ABA's annual meeting in August 1999. The Report was di-
rected to the House of Delegates, which is the policy-making
body of the ABA. The House is a body of some 530 delegates
representing states, counties, ABA sections, and some affiliated
organizations.71 The discussion of the Commission's Report in
the House in August 1999 was very impassioned. While there
was no vote on the merits of the Report, I believe it is fair to
conclude that the mood was predominantly negative to the Re-
port. A motion was offered, which the Commission itself sup-
ported, to defer consideration of the Report to a later meeting of
68. See id.
69. See id. Recommendation 8.
70. See Letter from Olivia F. Kirtley, Chair of the Board, American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants, to the Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice (July 30, 1999), available at <http:I/www.abanet.org/cpr/aicpa2.
html>.
71. ABA CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS, RULES OF PROCEDURE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, Article 6 (1999-2000); AMERICAN BAR ASSN, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE HANDBOOK 1 (1998-1999).
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the House. This was intended to allow more time to study the
Report and understand its implications.
While that motion was on the floor, a substitute motion
was offered, which has come to be known as the Florida Resolu-
tion, and it was adopted by a margin of about 2 to 1. The Flor-
ida Resolution provided:
RESOLVED, [t]hat the American Bar Association make no change, ad-
dition or amendment through the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct which permits a lawyer to offer legal services to a multidisciplin-
ary practice unless and until additional study demonstrates that such
changes will further the public interest without sacrificing or com-
promising lawyer independence, and the legal profession's tradition of
loyalty to clients.
7 2
The proponents of the Florida Resolution assert that it repre-
sents more than a deferral of consideration of the Report. They
assert that it sets a new standard.73 That standard is that the
ABA will not make any amendments to the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct relating to multidisciplinary practices until
study demonstrates such changes would further the public in-
terest, without sacrificing or compromising lawyer independ-
ence and the legal profession's tradition of loyalty to clients.
The Florida Resolution represents the most recent expres-
sion of policy by the American Bar Association on this subject.
There was further debate about MDPs at the ABA midyear
meeting in Dallas in February 2000, but no votes were taken.
In March 2000, the Commission issued a revised proposal after
reviewing the comments to its original Recommendation. 74 The
72. Florida Bar Recommendation Before the House of Delegates, at the
Am. Bar. Ass'n Annual Meeting in Atlanta (Aug. 10 1999), available at
<http:www.abanet.org/cpr/flbarrec.html>.
73. Daily Journal of the House of Delegates, 1999 Annual Meeting, At-
lanta, GA, available at <http'//www.abanet.org/leadership/ournal/99journal.
html>.
74. See COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
Ass'N, DRAFT RECOMMENDATION (Mar. 2000), available at <http'//www.
abanet.org/cpr/marchrec.html>.
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association amend the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct consisting with the following principles:
1. Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and join with nonlaw-
yer professionals in a practice that delivers both legal and nonlegal
professional services (Multidisciplinary Practice), provided that the
lawyers have the control and authority necessary to assure lawyer in-
dependence in the rendering of legal services. "Nonlawyer profession-
als" means members of recognized professions or other disciplines
that are governed by ethical standards.
2. This Recommendation must be implemented in a manner that pro-
tects the public and preserves the core values of the legal profession,
including competence, independence of professional judgment, protec-
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new proposal takes a more general approach to amending eth-
ics rules to permit MDPs than the original Recommendation. It
would only permit MDPs where lawyers have sufficient control
and authority to assure lawyer independence. The revised pro-
posal also differs from the original recommendation in provid-
ing that lawyers in an MDP should be restricted to practicing
with "members of recognized profession or other disciplines
that are governed by ethical standards. 7 5 The revised proposal
requires that it be implemented in a manner that preserves the
core values of the profession defined as including "competence,
independence of professional judgment, protection of confiden-
tial client information, loyalty to the client through the avoid-
ance of conflicts of interest, and pro bono publico obligations.'7 6
Many state bar associations and some local bar associa-
tions have established MDP commissions to develop a policy
recommendation for the court or legislature in their state hav-
ing jurisdiction over the rules of professional conduct. 77 Most of
these commissions will report their recommendations at the
annual meeting of their state or local bar association in the
spring/summer of 2000. It is anticipated that the House of
Delegates will consider the subject again at the Annual Meet-
ing of the ABA in July 2000 in New York.
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, the question of whether to regulate or pro-
hibit MDPs is one of the most important issues facing the legal
profession in recent times. How this question is answered will
not only affect present day lawyers but generations of lawyers
to come. The resolution may even change the way we define
ourselves and the duties we have to our clients and fellow
tion of confidential client information, loyalty to the client through
the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and pro bono publico obligations.
3. To protect the public interest, regulatory authorities should en-
force existing rules and adopt such additional enforcement procedures
as are needed to implement the principles identified in this Recom-
mendation.
4. This Recommendation does not alter the prohibition on nonlawyers
delivering legal services and the obligations of all lawyers to observe
the rules of professional conduct. Nor does it authorize passive in-
vestment in a Multidisciplinary Practice.
Id.
75. Id. Principle 1.
76. Id. Principle 2.
77. See Related Links to Bar Association MDP Committees and Reports,
(visited Apr. 3, 2000) <http//www.abanet.org/cpr/mdplinks.html>.
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members of the bar. It is evident by the attendance of foreign
bar leaders and the testimony they have given that the world's
legal community is waiting and watching to see what the
American legal profession does in this regard. Whatever the
outcome, we are sure to set a global precedent, which makes it
all the more important that this issue be studied and resolved
with great care. What is surely undeniable is that MDPs are a
development that must be addressed by the bar of this country
sooner rather than later.
